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Essay
GENETIC NARRATIVES:
BIOLOGY, STORIES, AND THE
DEFINITION OF THE
FAMILY
James Lindemann Nelson, Ph.D. t
THAT BIOMEDICINE'S power puts pressure on the idea of
"family" is neither a novel nor a particularly arcane notion.1
Still, despite the attention already directed to the subject, there are
aspects of the interconnections between families and biomedicine
which demand continued exploration. In this essay I seek to clarify
the role of genetic connection in our understanding of what is valua-
ble about family life.
The significance of "blood ties" is both highlighted and made
problematic by medicine's "new reproductive technologies," a large
assortment of ways in which physicians encourage reluctant eggs
and sperms to get together. Gamete donation and "surrogate moth-
erhood" are dramatic examples of medically mediated reproductive
interventions which raise questions about the importance of biologi-
cal connection, but the expense, invasiveness, and low success rates
of many forms of assisted reproduction testify to what many of us
are willing to go through in order to have children of "our own"-
that is, children with whom we share our genes.
More distantly but perhaps more profoundly, the importance of
biology and biological connectedness is reflected in the view of the
significance of genetics that at once nurtures and is nurtured by the
Human Genome Initiative. This latest example of federally spon-
sored "Big Science" endeavors to locate the position of human
genes on the chromosomes. It also attempts to identify the order of
t Associate for Ethical Studies, The Hastings Center, Briarcliff Manor, N.Y. 10510.
B.A., The Canisius College of Buffalo, N.Y. (1974); Ph.D., State University of New York at
Buffalo (1980).
1. See Ruth Macklin, Artificial Means of Reproduction and Our Understanding of the
Family, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 5.
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the chemical sub-units of DNA in any segment of a gene. The bil-
lions of dollars earmarked for this project eloquently testify to the
importance we place on genetics.2 We look to it for a deep under-
standing, not only of diseases such as Huntington chorea, or cystic
fibrosis, but an understanding of ourselves. Progressively, who we
are is being seen in terms of what genes we have and how they ex-
press themselves.
In order to get a finer sense of what it is we find so important at
the level of biology, I will contrast the account of familial ties which
gives pride of place to genetics with an account that stresses social
interactions-an instance of the enduring "nature-nurture" de-
bate-and conclude by developing an idea suggested by work of
William Ruddick: that the real significance of genetic ties is best
seen by their contribution to the richness of the ongoing familial
narrative in which our individual lives are enmeshed.'
A DISCURSIVE PRELUDE
The new reproductive technologies and practices are, for the
most part, unexceptionable from the perspective of a liberal polity.
Informed consent and explicit contracts abound, and if there are
problems with our current forms and contracts, reformist measures
would seem to meet the case-just provide better information, make
the contracts explicit, and hedge it all round with plenty of con-
sumer safeguards.' But we are not altogether comfortable with
these new ways of bringing children into the world, and tinkering
with the details does not seem to assuage our concern. Surrogate-
ship contracts, for example, are quite widely regarded as "unen-
forceable as contrary to public policy."5 Some of this concern likely
2. See Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, Mapping the Human Genome, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
579, 582 (1991).
3. I make very free with this idea, so expressing my indebtedness to Ruddick for
germinating my thinking about it should not be interpreted as attributing to him details,
implications, or even the language in which I express the notion. I take the basic thought
from the remarks made by William Ruddick in discussion of his paper, Ethics for Kith and
Kin, presented at the Hastings Center meeting on the Family and Bioethics, March 7, 1991
(paper on file at the Hastings Center).
4. See eg. Stephen G. York, A Contractual Analysis of Surrogate Motherhood and a
Proposed Solution, 24 Loy. L.A. REV. 395, 416 (1991); MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD 39 (1990).
5. In its report of state laws on surrogate motherhood, the American Fertility Society
reports that surrogacy is banned in Arizona, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Maryland,
Michigan, Utah, Washington, and North Dakota (American Fertility Society State Legisla-
ture Fact Sheet, 1990). Legislation to regulate surrogate contracts is currently being consid-
ered in California; the legislation distinguishes between genetic surrogates and gestational
surrogates who have no genetic link with the baby. Genetic surrogates would be allowed to
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stems from a conviction that such technologies threaten to exploit
the vulnerable in ways not easily regulated, or that they will rein-
force distortions in our culture's conception of the significance of
women. For example, consider "contract gestation," in which a
woman harbors and bears a child which grows from another wo-
man's fertilized ovum. While this form of technologically mediated
reproduction has had results which seem heartwarming (as well as
confusing) as in those celebrated cases in which women have ges-
tated their own grandchildren for infertile daughters,6 it also raises
more sinister specters of the exploitation of poor women as living
incubators of the children of privileged couples.7
But much of our residual hesitation over these new techniques
seems to reflect an allergy to medicalized reproduction's impact on
concepts and relationships that lie close to the heart of how we un-
derstand and value families. A quick survey of images and attitudes
evoked by reproductive technologies supports this suggestion. Sur-
rogate motherhood has conjured up the image of baby selling and
suggests uncomfortable analogies between motherhood and prosti-
tution.' Ovum donation, in which a woman provides a gamete to be
fertilized and gestated by a couple of which she is not a part, threat-
ens to make maternal identity as potentially ambiguous as paternal
identity.9
challenge for custody if they later change their mind, while gestational surrogates would lose
all rights. See Lynn Smith, Surrogacy Bill Reaches A Key Point in Long Gestation Period,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1992, at BI. For a full discussion of this issue, see Barbara L. Atwell,
Surrogacy and Adoption: A Case of Incompatibility, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTIS. L. REv. 1, 53
(1988); Lori B. Andrews, The Aftermath of Baby M: Proposed State Laws on Surrogate Moth-
erhood, HASTINGS CENrrER REP., Sept. 1987, at 31.
6. See John Battersby, Woman Pregnant with Daughter's Triplets, N. Y. TIMEs, April
9, 1987, at Al; Gina Kolata, When Grandmother is the Mother, Until Birth, N. Y. TIMES,
August 5, 1991, at Al.
7. See R. Arditti, Surrogate Mothering Exploits Women, 19 SCIENCE FOR THE PEOPLE,
22-23 (MAY-JUNE 1987); ALEXANDER M. CAPRON, Alternative Birth Technologies' Legal
Challenges, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REy. at 679, 704 (1987).
8. The analogy between prostitution and surrogacy is suggested in RICHARD T. HULL,
ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHOLOGIES (1990) at 153: The author
suggests that . . . contracting for the use of one's uterus is perilously close to contracting for
the use of one's vagina; the parallel with prostitution strikes many as compelling and all but
one of the states prohibit prostitution contracts."
9. It is worth noting that artificial insemination by donor, the male analogue of ovum
donation, has not occasioned similar concern; we seem rather more relaxed, as a society if not
always personally, about paternal ambiguities. See James L. Nelson, Parental Obligations
and the Ethics of Surrogacy: A Causal Perspective, 5 PUB. AFFAIRS Q. 49 (Jan., 1991). It is
also worth noting that the assumption of the incorrigibility of maternity obscures the issues
involved in adoption, and thus could be seen as loading the question in favor of biology over
nurture in determining what's essential about parenthood.
Ironically, contract gestation and ovum donation (or vending) make motherhood ambigu-
1992]
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At the same time, albeit somewhat less vividly, biomedicine's
growing interest in the human genome ' ° also sparks some concern
about why and how family ties are an important matter. The focus
on the genome as the key to unlocking human reality may under-
gird the tendency to construe human identity and fundamental rela-
tionships in terms of the biological links of genetics, rather than the
social ties of nurturance, or other biological connections, such as
gestation.11 This sort of thing has, at least in some corners of popu-
lar imagination, put medicine into company with more familiar
"threats" to the family such as television and mothers who work
outside the home. 2 Among scholars, it has incited calls for new
laws to clarify the family relationships that biomedicine has ob-
scured. 3 In (at least partial) contrast, I view these developments as
an opportunity to refine our understanding of what is important
about families. While such exploration may contribute to determin-
ing just what new public policies might be most defensible, delineat-
ing policy will not be my goal. I will particularly worry over the
question posed quite vividly by juxtaposing contract pregnancy and
gamete donation: ought genetic connections be privileged over
other forms of human connectedness in our understanding of family
life?
By way of stage setting, I begin with some remarks about a pair
of useful, although somewhat unstable distinctions: instrumental
versus transformative power, and regulative versus reflective
bioethics.
ous in precisely opposite fashions: contract gestation is predicated on the idea that what
makes someone a parent is their genetic link to the child; donation of gametes rests on just the
converse assumption, that it is the social, nurturing function of parenthood that is definitive.
Johnson v. Calvert, Cal. Super. Ct., Orange Co., Dept. 11, No. X633190 (Oct. 22, 1990)
raises both these questions; a woman who gave birth, but not an ovum, to a child was denied
any maternal standing on grounds of the primacy of genetic ties in determining parenthood.
See Philip Hager, State High Court to Rule in Child Surrogacy Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1992 at 1 (California Supreme Court will decide parental rights of surrogate mother, Anna
M. Johnson, who has no genetic link to test-tube baby she bore for a childless couple).
10. See Alfred I. Tauber & Sahotra Sarkar, The Human Genome Project: Has Blind
Reductionism Gone Too Far? 35 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE Winter, 1992,
at 220-35 & Thomas H. Murray, Ethical Issues in Human Genome Research 5 FASEB J.,
Jan. 1991 at 55-60.
11. Judge Parslow's decision in Johnson v. Calvert can be read just this way; in award-
ing custody of the child to the genetic parents, he brusquely dismissed the idea that the
gestational component of motherhood had any significance apart from the impersonal provi-
sion of service, renting a room, as it might be. See supra, note 9.
12. See generally The Twenty-First Century Family: Who Will We Be, How Will We
Live, NEWSWEEK, special edition, (Winter/Spring, 1990).
13. George J. Annas, Using Genes to Define Motherhood-The California Solution, 326
NEW ENG. J. MED. 417 (Feb. 6, 1992).
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POWER14
Our power is typically directed toward securing ends that we
value. For example, we strongly tend to value being free of any
nontrivial amount of pain, and so we develop a whole raft of tech-
nologies designed to achieve this end. These exemplify what I will
call instrumental power. We can also use our power in a different
way: not to achieve ends, but to change them. Bryan G. Norton
provides a vivid example of how this works: a teenager whose musi-
cal tastes are fixed on rock unwillingly attends a classical concert to
avoid offending her grandparents. 15 Much to her amazement, she
finds that live classical music is thrilling; without abandoning rock,
she now includes classical music in her listening and in her music
purchases. Norton speaks of the concert as exemplifying transform-
ative value; an object has transformative value if it provides an "oc-
casion for examining or altering a felt preference rather than simply
satisfying it."16 But we might also focus on how her grandparents
used their influence to alter their granddaughter's ends, and speak
of transformative power.
As I have already acknowledged, this is an unstable distinction:
some exercises of power will have both instrumental and transform-
ative elements. Sometimes transformative power will be used in an
instrumental way, as when someone wishes to change his culinary
tastes in order that he may lose weight. Further, transformative
power, although it has a dramatic ring to it, can be a fairly homey
phenomenon, as in the case that Norton cites. Still, power to trans-
form structures that are deeply involved in the formation of our
identities, and hence in the formation of our preferences, values,
and ends, is more and more a part of biomedicine, and, as I will
argue, particularly of those parts of biomedicine which affect fami-
lies. On its face, such power deserves careful attention.
BIOETHICS
The interdisciplinary field of bioethics is our culture's response
to this need for careful attention. It has attained a certain kind of
social significance as a regulative discourse, one that provides us
with the means of deliberating how to direct, control, and distribute
the power of contemporary biomedicine. But its deeper significance
14. For an extensive and illuminating discussion of the significance of power in
bioethics, see HOWARD BRODY, THE HEALER'S POWER (1992).
15. BRYAN G. NORTON, WHY PRESERVE NATURAL VARIETY? (1987).
16. Id. at 10.
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resides in its role as a reflective discourse, a meditation on the im-
pact of biomedical power on fundamental concepts that shape our
understanding of the world and guide our action in it-e.g., life,
death, freedom, aging, family.17 This distinction shadows that be-
tween instrumental and transformative power, and is subject to the
same kinds of messiness about the edges.
The genome project is a prime example of how biomedical
power portends important changes in the meaning of our lives. It is
potentially the most powerful example of how biological accom-
plishment and application may alter human reality, immediately
giving rise to clouds of "regulatory" kinds of questions: how do we
maintain confidentiality of information pertaining to a person's ge-
netic weaknesses? How do we prevent adverse consequences in
terms of employability and insurability? How should we set priori-
ties here, as we focus our resources on understanding one genetic
disease rather than another? How do we deal with the psychologi-
cal implications of the fact that, given a particular genetic disease
such as, say, Huntington chorea, diagnostic ability will precede
therapeutic ability by several years?
But the deeper, "reflective" questions are there as well: are
there any limits on the extent to which we ought to alter our genetic
composition? Will we have to give up our sense of ourselves as free
and responsible beings, whose fate is, to some extent, in our own
hands? And, for present purposes, a more concrete question:
should our growing understanding of the role of genetics in human
life have an impact on the meaning we attribute to an important
way in which genes are passed on in our species-through mar-
riages and the institution of the family?
FOCUS: FAMILIES AND THE IMPACT OF
BIOMEDICAL POWER
It is, I venture, a measure of the importance of families to our
lives that virtually any discussion of the topic must include some
explicit discussion of what is meant by "family," a requirement en-
forced much less vigorously when other complex and significant
ideas are on the table. However, writers have offered reasons for
suspicion about discussions of the moral significance of the family
which are not accompanied by articulated and defended defini-
tion-most typically that the family today takes on such a bewilder-
17. For the distinction between regulatory and reflective bioethics, I am indebted to
Daniel Callahan (in conversation).
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ing variety of forms that any assertions regarding it must be
carefully qualified."8 But rather than attempt a rigorous definition
in descriptive terms (e.g., "a group of individuals living under one
roof and usually under one head," or "the basic unit in society hav-
ing as its nucleus two or more adults living together and cooperat-
ing in the care and rearing of their own or adopted children"19) my
approach is normative. Starting with clear paradigm cases of fami-
lies, I ask, in effect, "Is there anything of special moral significance
happening in these groups? Are the characteristic forms of relation-
ship here especially bound up with goods which we appropriately
value highly, and which are not likely to be obtained elsewhere?" If
we can discern any interesting positive answers to these questions,
then we can use the presence of such features as the basis of our
definition of family as a morally significant notion.2" In other
words, any social arrangement which incorporates these special
goods, or at least most of them, will count as a family for present
purposes. While this is not an altogether rigorous approach to defi-
nition, it certainly has enough precision to get along with.
What special goods, then, do families contain and convey? An
important answer seems to lie along these lines: families, whatever
their particular configurations and bedeviling moral weaknesses, en-
dure, and ought to endure, because they are among the most impor-
tant mechanisms through which we form and sustain selves.
Families are significant contexts in which we enjoy intimate rela-
tionships, places in which we can express parts of ourselves which
we elsewhere suppress, places where we can know and be known
with a sort of particularity that doesn't often occur elsewhere.21
This does not mean that they are the only places where this kind of
work goes on, or even that they are the best places for it. But de-
spite these disclaimers, the tasks they undertake are deeply signifi-
cant. Further, families are important in an "outward" directed way
as well; they are the basis of our training in sociality, of our ability
18. Fred Rosner, 2 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 87 (Fall, 1991).
19. WEBsTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 343 (1987).
20. The danger with this approach is that it tends to obscure whatever may be going on
in "marginal" families which is of distinctive moral significance. For example, families con-
stituted by lesbian parents may be making important contributions to social justice, by under-
mining misogynistic assumptions that are prevalent in many other forms of social life.
However, if we see the paradigm case approach as one form of analysis of the moral signifi-
cance of families, to be supplemented by others-particularly others focusing on the impor-
tance of difference, as well as of resemblance-this danger may be lessened.
21. SALVATORE MINUCHIN, FAMILIES AND FAMILY THERAPYY (1974). See also
James L. Nelson, Parenthood and Partialism, 21 J. OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY (Spring, 1990).
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to respond to others as people with ends of their own, quite possibly
distinct from our own ends.22
Having sketched out why families are important, the question
becomes whether biomedicine is exerting transformative power on
the family, i.e., power that will alter not simply how it goes about
obtaining its ends, but those ends themselves. The power of bi-
omedicine is exerted both through biology, and through the social
practices and structures in which its biological insights are put to
use. To understand and assess its impact on the family, we need to
sort out the contribution of biology, on the one hand, and culture,
on the other, to what it is that makes families important.
Focusing on the role of families in forming and maintaining
selves might seem to suggest that social relations-the nurturing
ties through which individuals become acculturated-are of pri-
mary significance in understanding what is important about fami-
lies. There is, however, a great deal of evidence that suggests that
genetic ties are of immense importance to family life. The experi-
ence of many adopted children is on point here; researchers report a
consensus in the literature that adoptees are more vulnerable than
nonadoptees to "identity problems developing in adolescence and
young adulthood,"23 and anecdotes abound concerning the search
of children raised in loving, nurturing adoptive homes, for the
birthparents whom they have never seen.24
From the perspective that sees the essential moral tasks of fami-
lies as forming, nurturing, and maintaining selves, this seems rather
curious. Why should people seek out those who have merely a
physical relationship with them, think of them as somehow linked
to them as parents, when they have been the recipients of prolonged
and intense caring, day after day, year after year? Why isn't it
enough to be intimately involved with those who have been so
deeply engaged in shaping one's loves, values, preferences, and life
plans?
Consider this possibility: our genetic ties are extremely impor-
tant to us. Our genes determine, to an important extent, our identi-
ties as persons. The genome project is telling us more and more
about this, but we have really known it all along. And this is part of
22. LAURA PURDY, IN THEIR BEST INTERESTS? (1992).
23. RUTH G. McRoy, ET AL., OPENNESS IN ADOPTION: NEW PRACTICES, NEW IS-
SUES 4 (1988).
24. For discussions of the prevalence and significance of such searches, see MICHAEL
HUMPHREY & HEATHER HUMPHREY, FAMILIES WITH A DIFFERENCE: VARIETIES OF SUR-
ROGATE PARENTHOOD (1988).
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the key to understanding both the significance and the form of the
family: ideally, it is an association which is based in nature, not in
contrivance or artifice. While our sociability in other contexts may
indeed be said to be natural, it is not as deep or fixed as the intimate
relationships that are grounded in genetic connection--contrast, for
example, the prevalence of divorce, which sets aside a contractual
relationship, with the rarity of "disowning" one's children.
Families founded on, or expanded by, surrogate motherhood or
gamete donation are families which are founded (at least in part) on
artifice, not (wholly) on nature. The contingency of human life
makes it inescapable that some parents will die before their children
are raised, or that they will not be in a position to raise their chil-
dren after their birth. Therefore, some families must be constituted
or augmented by artifice. But these families represent a compro-
mise with necessity, and inherit a good deal of problematic baggage.
On the other hand, if we explicitly engineer situations in which fam-
ilies rest on artifact rather than nature, then we are setting out for
our own purposes to put children in situations in which they will
not enjoy intimate contact with their genetic relations. The conse-
quences of this can only be guessed, but our difficulties with adop-
tion provide significant hints.25
There is, of course, another view of all this, from which human
beings and their relationships are seen as more or less independent
of biology. What's most important from this perspective is our sta-
tus as autonomous agents, and the most fundamental kind of moral
relationship is, then, the contract, a form of interaction which pat-
terns human interaction from the most formal to the most intimate.
Marriages are clearly contractual, but we can even view the process
of "starting a family" as volitional and at least quasi contractual. A
couple-or an individual, for that matter-decides to start a family,
or augment one. They consider their options. Many people are in a
position to become part of a "pregnant couple"; some are not, and
must exercise other options. But even those who can become preg-
nant sometimes avail themselves of other options, and even after
25. See Paul M. Brinich, Some Potential Effects ofAdoption on Self and Object Represen-
tations in THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 107 (Albert J. Solnit et al. eds.,
1980); Paul M. Brinich & Evelin B. Brinich, Adoption and Adaptation, 170 J. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISEASE 489 (1982). These authors suggest that adoption is "always painful and
potentially traumatic" because of its involvement in two significant "social failures": first,
that the child is unwanted; second, that the adoptive parents are unable to conceive. Brinich
and Brinich conclude that the "psychopathological potential" of these failures is great. See
also Katharine Davis Fishman, Problem Adoptions, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1992,
at 37.
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pregnancy commences, there are still choice points: a pregnant wo-
man, at least if she possesses sufficient economic resource, can de-
cide whether she wants to go through with the pregnancy. And
then, even after the baby is born, the parents can decide whether or
not to nurture her or him as parents. Sara Ruddick likens this deci-
sion on the part of the biological parents to the decision to adopt a
child on the part of nonbiological parents-every child is adopted,
on this scenario.26
While it is true that many children who are adopted out of their
genetic families later wish to make contact with them, and that
some are distressed if they can't, that surely is more plausibly attrib-
uted to a certain kind of socialization, a certain romanticization of
the family, rather than to some altogether obscure idea of "genes
calling to genes" directly. As a response to the point pressed earlier
about the rarity of disowning children contrasting with the ubiquity
of divorce, consider the tendency for men who are not integrated
into a functioning, social family, to abandon or much attenuate
their relationship to their children. 27 Fathers are as genetically re-
lated to their kids as are mothers; isn't it very plausible that male
patterns of socialization, with their emphasis on separation and in-
dividuality, are involved in the explanation for this phenomenon?28
GENETIC NARRATIVES
Two images of why families are important have been presented
here. The first, which might be called the "natural kind" view of
families, emphasizes the rooting of familial relationships in biologi-
cal processes which, while surely affected by social constructs, in
some sense underlie social constructs, make them possible, and are
more fundamental. This view seems to accommodate some signifi-
cant data about family relationships-our persistence in seeking out
genetic ties, our increasing technological ingenuity in learning how
to establish them-but seems unable to handle other data, male
abandonment of children, for example. Further, the mechanism
26. "To adopt is to commit oneself to protecting, nurturing and training particular chil-
dren. Even the most passionately loving birthgiver engages in a social, adoptive act when she
commits herself to sustain an infant in the world." SARA RUDDICK, MATERIAL THINKING
51 (1989).
27. For a compendium of relevant data, see SusAN OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE
FAMILY 134-69 (1989).
28. M. Rivka Polatnik, Why Men Don't Rear Children: A Power Analysis, in MOTHER-
ING: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 21 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983).
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through which all this happens seems obscure. Are we supposed to
posit some kind of brutely biological urge here?
The second, "social artifact" view of the family has the great
strength of seeming to acdord more closely with how it is that fami-
lies do their most morally significant work: forging and maintain-
ing human selves, not simply human bodies. It also seems able to
accommodate the variability in family forms, not all of which are
predicated on genetic connections, and offer a more intuitively ac-
ceptable view of how and why familial relationships get set up: we
desire the goods of intimacy and support they provide, and we
choose to pursue them. The social artifact view's great weakness is
that it seems to have no special place for genetic connections, and
the data indicating that genetic ties are important to us cannot be
simply dismissed.
I call the mediating conception I wish to offer the "genetic nar-
rative" view of the family. This nomenclature suggests that the role
of genetic connections in our lives can be seen, not as "gene calling
to gene," but rather as a part of our interest in perceiving the con-
nections between our lives and the lives of others-connections
which add depth and richness to the continuing story in which we
participate, and which can therefore be referred to as narrative
connections.
Human beings seek to transcend their own immediate experi-
ence somehow-actually, in many ways. Family connections are a
part of that desire-the desire to transcend finitude. Sometimes we
focus on the drive to beat mortality by looking only at death. In-
deed, one of the best-known arguments of the Stoic philosophers
was designed to demonstrate that fear of or grief concerning death
was irrational by pointing out that we do not lament the time before
our birth, or before anyone else was born. But the drive for rela-
tionship with those to whom we are genetically connected, can, I
think, be seen as an answer-in part-to this Stoic consolation. We
are not personally indifferent to what happened before we were
born. It represents a part of our story, the earlier chapters of which
are a part of the ongoing narrative, and without which we cannot
read well what is going on in the part occurring now. Families are
often seen as ways of achieving a kind of immortality, and there's
something to this, but we should bear in mind the possibility that
they serve to help us achieve immortality in both directions, as it
were.
HEALTH MATRIX
GENETIC NARRATIVES: A REFLECTIVE CONCLUSION
The "natural kind" view of families suggested that untwisting
the social, gestational and genetic strands of parenthood opens up
children to a special kind of alienation and loss, and that the indi-
vidual and social consequences of this loss are not fully known.
This uncertainty ought to give us pause before going ahead with
retailoring the substance of family relationships.
The "artifact" view suggested on the other hand that really none
of this was so novel. All morally significant ties are really volitional
ties, and any special distress occasioned by reproductive techniques
that sunder genes and rearing would be a function of socialization
not nature. As such, the distress would likely be less deep, more
individualized, easier to handle.
The "genetic narrative" view points out that there really is an
important kind of vulnerability to which children are exposed here,
residing not in some brutely biological call of blood, but rather in
the structures of meaning through which we try to make sense of
our lives. What that may direct us to is an important element in
meaning-moral and intimate relationships-which are part of
what gives cohesiveness and quality to our lives, part of the way in
which we feel both situated and recognized as individuals. The dif-
ficulty with either male or female surrogacy may not be in the expe-
rience of those who feel a great bond to the child they have helped
create, but those who do not. For they are the ones who block an
avenue of meaning to a child, and whose action may carry the im-
plication that the child herself-her own story-is not significant to
her biological father or mother, whose stories are bound up with the
child's, its extensions into the past.
However, there is a possible fault lying near the heart of this
attempt to marry the biological and the "meaning-seeking" aspects
of human reality. Can the very phenomena that may be shown to
lie at the heart of our abilities to seek for meaning themselves de-
prive us of any meaning our lives might have? Could deep knowl-
edge of the structures that have allowed us to evolve into creatures
who see their lives in terms of stories, with their open-ended charac-
ter, actually transform those lives into things which can at base be
understood fully through the non-narrative, more deterministic
structure of scientific explanation? Our stories connect us to a fixed
past, but they also open out into a future whose character is partly
determined by what we do; they account for the character we have,
but also provide the possibility of new challenges which give rise to
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new decisions, which can transform our characters. To the extent
that our genes provide the fundamental explanation for who we are
and what we choose to do with our lives, to that extent the narrative
character of life seems illusory.
This sort of worry is not only hard to allay, it is even hard to be
sure one has stated it sensibly. But it seems real, for all that, and
deserving of at least a partial answer. It may in fact turn out that
the central task of bioethics is not to sketch out the appropriate
character of informed consent, or even to pronounce on the moral-
ity of assisted reproduction, but rather to reflect on the implications
of biomedicine's knowledge and power for what it is to lead a mean-
ingful human life.
It may be worth bearing in mind in this connection that our
seeking the truth of our genetic story is really a matter of the same
drive for transcendence and completeness and connection that
makes us look to our personal pasts and into our personal futures;
from this perspective, science is important to us for reasons not un-
like those which make families important to us. The end of our
truth-seeking may reveal that we are not the coauthors of our own
narratives, but rather highly determined by our genes and their in-
teraction with our environment. If so, we may take some comfort
from reflecting that we are an important part of a wider story than
our own; we can still see ourselves as the part of the universe which
has the ability to understand itself. Along with caring for those we
love, and striving to make of the world a more peaceful and fairer
place, the epistemic roles we play seem not without their own spe-
cial dignity, even if the script turns out to be not our own. 9
29. An earlier version of this essay was given as a lecture at Mount Union College in
Alliance, Ohio. The lecture was given under the auspices of the GTE Foundation Lecture
Services on Technology and Ethics. I am indebted to Mount Union College, and to the GTE
Foundation for providing insight and reaction.
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